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China pe rspect i vesEditorial
Twenty Years After the Handover
Hong Kong’s Political and Social Transformation and Its Future under China’s Rule 
JEAN-PIERRE  CABESTAN AND ÉRIC  FLORENCE
The Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (XRL) as wellas its Kowloon West terminal are due to open before the end ofSeptember 2018. There is probably no saga that better encapsulates
Hong Kong’s delicate situation as well as its relations with the central gov-
ernment just 21 years after the British colony’s return to the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC) in 1997. Many Hong Kong pan-democrats and
opposition politicians have questioned the so-called co-location of border
procedures at West Kowloon Station, which implies the ceding of part of
Hong Kong’s Special Administrative Region (SAR) back to the mainland and
the permanent presence of mainland China’s immigration and quarantine
officers empowered to implement mainland law in the heart of Hong
Kong. (1) Some legal procedures launched by opposition politicians are still
pending, but for both the Beijing and Hong Kong authorities it is a done
deal. Other issues attached to the XRL, such as its high cost, construction
defects, expensive ticket prices, likely unprofitability, and delays have marred
its construction and completion. Nonetheless, this ambitious, long-planned,
and long-expected project has raised many questions about Hong Kong’s
economic integration with the mainland, political and legal autonomy, as
well as Hong Kong identity, more than 20 years after the handover. It has,
to put it simply, led a growing number of Hong Kongers to ask themselves:
is the SAR likely to become just another Chinese metropolis like Shanghai
or Guangzhou? Can Hong Kong keep not only its promised “high degree of
autonomy” but also its uniqueness?
Presented at a conference co-organised by the French Centre for Research
on Contemporary China and Hong Kong Baptist University’s Department
of Government and International Studies in September 2017, the five arti-
cles selected for this special issue underscore some of the crucial political
and social transformations that have been taking place in Hong Kong since
the handover. But none of them point in any way towards a full integration
of Hong Kong into the PRC’s polity and society. (2) These contributions, draw-
ing from the fields of sociology, political sciences, political economy, and
social sciences, are all written by Hong Kong scholars who in addition to
producing outstanding scholarship all show, we feel, a particularly high de-
gree of commitment to the future of their city. 
On every front, Hong Kong has dramatically changed since its return to
the motherland. The oldest and most fundamental transformation has been
of an economic nature, a metamorphosis that started long before the han-
dover, favoured by China’s reform and opening policy launched in 1979
and by the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, which cemented the terri-
tory’s return to the PRC under Deng Xiaoping’s “one country, two systems”
formula. Hong Kong’s growing integration into the Chinese economy has
been the natural and logical outcome of not only China’s economic rise
but also the rebalancing of the world economy in favour of East Asia. The
Express Rail Link and the Hong Kong Macau Zhuhai Bridge project, which
is also due for completion in 2018, illustrate this inevitable integration and
the increasing cross-border transportation needs resulting from it. Today,
while Hong Kong tycoons such as Li Ka-shing continue to occupy key po-
sitions in the Hong Kong economy while diversifying their investment des-
tinations, many sectors remain dominated by mainland Chinese
companies: 50% of the construction sector; and 50% of the firms listed
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, to take just two examples. Launched
in 2018, Beijing’s “Greater Bay Area” project will speed up the integration
of Hong Kong’s (as well as Macau’s) economy into Guangdong’s most pros-
perous and dynamic area (GDP: US$1.5 trillion and probably $2.8 trillion
by 2025). Simultaneously, Hong Kong’s weight in the Chinese economy
has dramatically decreased, from 27% on the eve of the handover to less
than 3% now. This steady economic integration and relative decline have
already had multiple consequences, including social and political ones. In-
deed, Hong Kong’ social transformation has been no less significant. For
one thing, the legal settlement of 150 mainland Chinese per day in the
territory since 1997 has gradually modified SAR society. Today, at least one
Hong Konger out of seven (more than one million out of a population of
7.3 million) was born in the mainland and tends to speak Mandarin (or Pu-
tonghua) rather than Cantonese at home. Conversely, a growing number
of Hong Kongers work and live on the mainland, including more than
500,000 in Guangdong alone. In addition, more and more Hong Kong com-
panies are hiring mainland cadres because of their command of Mandarin
and their connections across the border or in the north of the country. A
growing number of rich mainland families, including members or relatives
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Nomenklatura have at least set a
foot in Hong Kong, if not always settling there, acquiring in the process a
resident’s permit and a passport allowing them convenient travel to many
countries without a visa. More mainland middle class youth are coming to
study in Hong Kong universities, knowing that if they complete a Master’s
degree, they will be given one year to find a job locally, which they often
do. And in order to acquire more financial flexibility, a growing number of
public and private PRC firms have set up subsidiaries or stand-alone com-
panies in Hong Kong, often registered in one of the Caribbean tax havens.
We remember that in June 2003, in the immediate aftermath of the SARS
crisis and just before the massive demonstrations against the “national se-
curity law,” the central government “offered” Hong Kong a supposedly ad-
vantageous economic and trade agreement, known as the Closer Economic
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA). In retrospect, however, it seems that
Hong Kongers have not benefited as much as expected from this new part-
nership (Lui 2014).
1. See for instance Linda Chelan Li, “High Speed Train Sparks Co-location Controversy,” East Asia
Forum, 7 April 2018, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/04/07/high-speed-rail-sparks-co-loca-
tion-controversy-in-hong-kong/ (accessed on 11 September 2018).
2. Titled “Twenty Years After: Hong Kong’s Changes and Future under China’s Rule,” this international
conference was held at Hong Kong Baptist University on 21-22 September 2017. 
This steady flow of wealthy mainland Chinese to Hong Kong has had a
direct impact on property prices, pushing them up and deepening the al-
ready shocking social inequalities. (3) The Hong Kong government, particu-
larly the C.Y. Leung administration (2012-2017), took a number of measures
to better manage these growing social tensions between mainland new-
comers and local Hong Kongers: among them, we can cite the interdiction
introduced in 2013 for pregnant mainland women to give birth in Hong
Kong and through their babies acquire right of abode in the SAR; the intro-
duction in 2012 of a drastic 15% stamp duty on property purchased by
non-permanent residents; and the crackdown imposed in 2015 on parallel
border trading of all sorts of products that mainland customers prefer to
acquire in Hong Kong (such as milk powder). 
However, the Hong Kong government has been much less pro-active in
addressing the community’s dramatic housing problems: Tung Chee-hwa,
the first Chief Executive (1997-2005), actually cut many of the social hous-
ing schemes introduced by the British. His successor, Donald Tsang (2005-
2012), whose cosy relations with the rich eventually led him to jail, also did
little. As a result, living conditions for the average Hong Kong family have
deteriorated (Goodstadt 2013; Wong 2015). Social inequalities and polari-
sation have increased, pushing many retirees and also youth into poverty
(Lee et al. 2014). Today, Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient is one of the highest
in the world, reaching 0.539 in 2017 against 0.533 in 2006, (4) in any event
far above the 0.4 “international inequality threshold alert line.” Hong Kong’s
ten top billionaires have a net worth equivalent to 35% of its GDP (Car-
tledge 2017: 23). Again, it was C.Y. Leung who tried to increase subsidised
public housing estates, but pressured by both developers and Beijing au-
thorities, he did not deliver much. Today, it is all but impossible for any
young couple to buy a flat and settle down without their parents helping
with the down-payment. The social divide between home-owners and other
Hong Kongers has contributed to declining social mobility and is polarising
society. According to a 2016 Hong Kong government report, there are some
210,000 subdivided flats, and about 25% of those living in these flats are
students 18 years of age or younger. (5) Wan and Wong show in their con-
tribution to this special issue that with the persistent rise in asset prices,
university students on the whole feel very pessimistic about the possibility
of acquiring housing, and that they show a tendency to turn more politically
radical. Such an insight is actually consistent with the fact that young peo-
ple tend to predominantly support the localists, and in this respect unequal
access to housing ownership may be conceived of as one of the socio-eco-
nomic causes of the 2014 Umbrella Movement (Wan and Wong in this
issue).
Nonetheless, the Umbrella Movement was triggered by other forces,
more political in nature and resulting from a long stalemate between Bei-
jing and Hong Kong’s pro-democracy camp regarding the SAR’s future in-
stitutions and full democratisation. The aforementioned Sino-British Joint
Declaration, in spite of its ambiguous language, promised Hong Kongers
full democracy: a parliament, the Legislative Council or Legco, and a Chief
Executive (CE) elected by universal suffrage, in addition to an independent
judiciary and court of final appeal. After having dismantled the Legco
democratisation measures that Chris Patten, the last British governor, had
introduced, the central government in Beijing procrastinated on the polit-
ical reform initially planned for 2007-2008 in accordance with the Basic
Law, Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” adopted by China’s National People’s
Congress (NPC) in 1990 (Ortman 2016). The immediate cause of this de-
cision was the July 2003 National Security Law fiasco: in the aftermath of
the SARS crisis, half a million Hong Kongers demonstrated against a law
that the SAR government was required to draft according to Article 23 of
Hong Kong’s Basic Law, but which could, in their eyes, dangerously restrict
civil liberties. The central government then decided to freeze all political
reform and concentrated on deepening its “united front” strategy aimed
at better reaching out to not only Hong Kong elites but also to all seg-
ments of its society. In other words, it wanted to create a pro-establish-
ment and pro-Beijing political majority before contemplating full
democratisation of the SAR. In that respect, gaining the full support of
Hong Kong business elites was crucial, and it can be argued that the Beijing
authorities succeeded on that front (Fong 2014a). Facilitating the estab-
lishment (as early as 1992) and expansion of a pro-Beijing local political
party, namely the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
(DAB), was equally important. Encouraged by the Central Government Li-
aison Office, the DAB in 2005 merged with the more pro-business Hong
Kong Progressive Alliance to become the Democratic Alliance for the Bet-
terment and Progress of Hong Kong. This fusion clearly helped the DAB
reach out to the middle class and become, at least until the Umbrella
Movement, the SAR’s major political party. The central government’s re-
sistance to the development of a party-based government, with all of its
consequences in terms of executive-legislative disconnection and govern-
ment dysfunction, also played a role in the postponement of political re-
form (Fong 2014b; Goodstadt 2018). As a result, the political reform
package and in particular the introduction of the CE election by universal
suffrage were postponed until 2014. (6) At this time the NPC-sponsored po-
litical reform package is frozen again, probably until the pro-establishment
camp gains a two-thirds majority in Legco, a prospect that cannot be ex-
cluded in view of the amount of money and support that the DAB gets
from the Central Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong. (7) Any plan to
abolish Legco’s professional constituencies seems to have been buried.
As is well-known, the political reform plan issued on 31 August 2014 by
the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC) and supported by C. Y. Leung, the
DAB, and pro-establishment elites dissatisfied many segments of Hong
Kong society, directly triggering the Umbrella Movement. The NPCSC then
proposed that only two or at most three CE candidates would be allowed
to run and that these candidates would first be selected by a nominating
committee very similar to the existing pro-establishment and pro-Beijing
dominated 1,200-member election committee, which had elected the first
three CEs who had administered Hong Kong since 1997.
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3. For an analysis of the drivers of economic inequality in Hong Kong since the 1980s, see Wong
(2017: 4-10).
4. “Wealth Gap in Hong Kong Hits Record High,” Business Insider, 9 June 2017, https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/hong-kong-wealth-gap-problem-2017-6 (accessed on 12 September 2018).
5. In addition to these 210,000 people, about 40,000 more live in “cage homes” or “cubicle homes.”
See “10,000 more Hongkongers call subdivided units home, study shows,” South China Morning
Post, 19 January 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/community/article/2129583/
10000-more-hongkongers-call-subdivided-units-home-study (accessed on 12 September 2018);
for statistical highlights of this report, see https://www.legco.gov.hk/research-publications/en-
glish/1718issh32-subdivided-units-in-hong-kong-20180626-e.pdf (accessed on 12 September
2018). For photographic reportage, see Benny Lam, “Boxed in: life inside the ‘coffin cubicles’ of
Hong Kong – in pictures,” The Guardian, 7 June 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/gallery/
2017/jun/07/boxed-life-inside-hong-kong-coffin-cubicles-cage-homes-in-pictures (accessed on
12 September 2018).
6. The only minor political concession made by Beijing to the pan-democrats was the addition in
2010 of five super-seats elected by elected district councils to Legco, the membership of which
was expanded from 60 to 70 members. But among the 70 members, while now 40 (more than
half) are elected by Hong Kong geographical constituencies, 30 remain elected by pro-establish-
ment-dominated and undemocratic professional constituencies. See Ortman 2016.
7. SCMP, 3 September 2018, art. cit.
Editorial
This is not the place to try re-assess the Umbrella Movement. Suffice to
say that this 79-day mobilisation of large segments of Hong Kong society,
particularly its youth and students, constituted a turning point in Hong
Kong’s post-handover political history. Initiated by the Occupy Central
movement, a group of academics who had hoped that a brief civil disobe-
dience action would convince the government in Beijing to change its mind,
the Umbrella “Revolution” was rapidly taken over by more radicalised young
activists who had distanced themselves from the traditional pro-democracy
parties and would later lay the foundations of the localist movement (Yuen
2015; Ma and Cheng 2018).
To be sure, the Umbrella Movement was no revolution. It collapsed not
only because of Beijing’s adamant refusal to negotiate and growing oppo-
sition from other segments of Hong Kong society (the so-called blue-rib-
bons), but also because of divisions among its organisers (8) and the
accumulation of judicial actions launched against its supporters’ prolonged
illegal occupation of public space. Nonetheless, this confrontation high-
lighted the rigidity of both the Beijing authorities and the C.Y. Leung ad-
ministration, including Carry Lam, the current CE and then major
interlocutor with the Umbrella Movement’s leaders, as well as the power-
lessness of the traditional pan-democrats. And rapidly, the failure of the
Umbrella Movement gave the central government an opportunity to further
narrow Hong Kong’s so-called “high degree of autonomy.” While the wider
pan-democratic camp managed to keep most of its seats in the September
2016 Legco election, it is now deeply fragmented and has rapidly lost a
number of its elected localists. Yuen and Chung document, for instance, in
this special issue how the government’s reaction to the rise of localists,
which combined prosecuting some for their participation in the Umbrella
Movement, barring localist candidates from participating in the electoral
process, and tolerating increasingly vocal counter-movement protests, re-
sulted in the formation of a “divided structure of contestation,” allowing
some—the traditional pro-democracy parties—to participate in the formal
political process while pushing others—localist parties—outside of the sys-
tem. Although the localist movement is itself highly fragmented (Kaeding
2017; Kwong 2016), the central government and its Liaison Office have
adopted a rather heavy-handed strategy against anyone promoting Hong
Kong independence, as any pro-independence public speech is less and less
tolerated by the Hong Kong government, preparing the groundwork for the
drafting of the long-postponed national security law.
There have been other signs of Hong Kong’s narrowing civil freedoms,
such as the deteriorating situation of press freedom over the years (see Lee
in this issue). Moreover, while it remains possible to publish books and pe-
riodicals critical of the PRC regime, it is getting harder and harder to have
them distributed: more than half of Hong Kong’s bookstores are now con-
trolled by Sino United Publishing, a company directly controlled by Beijing’s
Liaison Office in Hong Kong. (9) This concentration strategy has had a much
more negative impact on publication freedom and diversity than the secret
abductions in 2015 by PRC public security officials in both Hong Kong and
in Thailand, and the prosecution on the mainland, of a handful of Hong Kong
publishers who specialised in writing and selling political gossip books across
the border as a way to make a living. 
In other words, Hong Kongers will have to accept living in a political sys-
tem that is still basically “hybrid” or “semi-democratic,” but risks moving
towards semi-authoritarianism (i.e., the Singaporean model) if civil liberties
are further restrained (for instance if Article 23 legislation is introduced).
Finally, there have been many questions asked about the independence of
Hong Kong’s judiciary in the aftermath of the trial in 2017 of a number of
Hong Kong activists and localists. By and large, Hong Kong courts and judges
are likely to remain independent. But Hong Kong’s political environment,
especially the Beijing Liaison Office’s frequent interference and the NPC
Standing Committee’s power of final interpretation, have put stronger pres-
sure on Hong Kong judges, including foreign judges who are invited to ad-
judicate cases (Davis 2015; Chan 2018). 
What are Hong Kong’s options now?
For one thing, economically, Hong Kong will have to accept a gradual in-
tegration into Guangdong’s “Greater Bay Area,” even though it will remain
uneven and incomplete because of the many legal and practical hurdles to
full integration. Simultaneously, its weight in the Chinese economy will
probably continue to decrease, even if mainland China’s growth rate falls
to 4 or 5 %. Likewise, its expensive sea port activities are likely to move
even farther north, be it inside the Pearl River Delta or to the Shanghai area.
Nonetheless, as long as the renminbi, the PRC’s currency, remains non-con-
vertible and Beijing keeps tight control on capital flows, Hong Kong’s finan-
cial centre will continue to prosper by occupying a very specific and useful
role, including for mainland Chinese elites. Some of its other economic sec-
tors, such as its airport and its cargo business, have a good chance of car-
rying on as well. 
For another thing, since Hong Kong is likely to remain, if not a safe haven,
at least a freer place for rich Chinese, its social fabric will remain highly un-
equal and polarised. Future CEs may do more for the poor in terms of cheap
housing and social benefits. However, by and large Hong Kong has a good
chance of remaining one of the world’s most expensive and unequal cities. 
But does that mean that Hong Kong might at some point lose its unique-
ness and become fully integrated into the mainland? Actually, as alluded
above, all the parties involved in Hong Kong’s future have a vested interest
in keeping Hong Kong distinct and separate from the mainland, arguably
even after 2047 (Bland 2017). In other words, the Hong Kong SAR’s special
status is likely to remain in place for a long time, even if its political auton-
omy is likely to continue to shrink. And as Chan and Fung document below,
Hong Kong identity keeps changing in opposite directions. On the one hand,
since the Umbrella Movement, a growing portion of Hong Kongers oppose
identifying with any kind of Chineseness; on the other hand, Hong Kong’s
economic and social “mainlandisation” has already contributed to keeping
Hong Kongers’ dual identity (as both Hongkongese and Chinese) dominant.
The final result of this “struggle” will depend upon Beijing’s policies towards
the SAR as well as the ability of the Hong Kong government to better bridge
the social gap between the rich and the poor. 
The five contributions in this special issue offer unique insights into the
major patterns of change and continuity in the political, social, and eco-
nomic spheres since the handover of Hong Kong to China more than two
decades ago. In the first paper Francis Lee provides a balanced assessment
of the worsening situation of press freedom in Hong Kong as well as the
counterbalancing forces within the political economic structure of the
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8. Kwok and Chan (2017) show, for instance, that pressure from student organisations and from
protesters contributed to delegitimising the leadership of the Umbrella Movement and thereby
weakened its effectiveness. 
9. “Liaison Office indirectly owns most bookshops,” RTHK, 28 May 2018, http://news.rthk.hk/rthk/
en/component/k2/1398644-20180528.htm (accessed on 12 September 2018); “Long read: In
Hong Kong’s book industry, ‘everybody is scared’. Book shops closing, printers declining work, peo-
ple disappearing, no, it’s not the latest horror movie,” The Guardian, 29 December 2016,
https://yp.scmp.com/education/article/105230/long-read-hong-kongs-book-industry-everybody-
scared (accessed on 12 September 2018).
Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Éric Florence – Twenty Years After the Handover
media such as market forces, journalistic professionalism, and persisting di-
versity in media outlets. Lee first highlights that while during the so-called
“transition period” (1984 to 1997), Hong Kong enjoyed an “unprecedented
degree” of press freedom, the transformations in economic ownership were
already underway before 1997. Significantly, he describes a general pattern
of Hong Kong media ownership that by the mid-2000s had become in-
creasingly embedded in the mainland’s state and business interests. This
pattern is then followed, Lee shows, by Hong Kong business people increas-
ingly leaving the field of media ownership and conversely Chinese capital
entering the field. Eventually, this opening contribution also depicts how
the development of digital media impacts the political economy of the
media and press freedom in Hong Kong, with the conventional media’s busi-
ness model being deeply disrupted by the surge in revenue from digital ad-
vertising and by the development of the digital media sphere itself. 
In the second contribution of this special issue, Samson Yuen and Sanho
Chung provide a vivid and rich account of the ebbs and flows of a far-from-
unified localist movement and its dialectical relationship with a variety of
measures implemented by the Hong Kong government to tame the rise of
localists. The two authors argue that the initial success of localism, its cur-
rent features, and its decline in mobilisation power ought to be accounted
for by relying not only on socio-political and economic structural factors,
but also through a framework that encompasses a wide range of public dis-
course and the role of various actors such as activists, protesters, public
opinion, pro-establishment and pro-democratic actors, state agents, etc.
They highlight a number of features of the localist protests compared to
traditional earlier pro-democratisation movements, i.e. their more con-
frontational nature, focusing chiefly on material or livelihood problems in-
stead of issues of democracy and civic liberties, being initiated and
organised predominantly on online platforms by politically inexperienced
netizens, as well as the xenophobic and anti-mainland Chinese character of
some of them. 
In the following contribution, Kin Man Wan and Stan Wong shed light on
the redistributive and electoral consequences of the housing boom that
started from the mid-2000s. Their contribution adds to this special issue
and to the scientific literature on Hong Kong localism by providing a polit-
ical-economic glimpse as a complement to studies that focus chiefly on
cultural and social explanations for the rise of localist parties and elec-
torates. The authors show that the rise in asset prices invariably favours
homeowners while those without assets fare considerably worse, and that
this translates into specific voting preferences. Based on data from a newly
available electoral survey of the 2016 Legislative Council election, they pro-
vide evidence to support their argument that not owning one’s own home
can be considered a strong predictor of electoral preference for localist par-
ties, while the level of income cannot be considered a significant predictor
of voting preferences. 
Drawing from findings of the Hong Kong identity surveys from 2010 to
2016, Chan Chi Kit and Anthony Fung then delve into the complicate rela-
tionship between state nationalism in Hong Kong and Hong Kongers’ iden-
tification with civic values of freedom and democratisation, as well as ethnic
and cultural pride. They highlight the shortcomings of a Chinese state-spon-
sored nation building that hinges chiefly on ethnic and cultural appeal while
playing down civil liberties. Chan and Fung write of a “disarticulation” of
Chinese state nationalism from the values of civic rights adamantly cher-
ished by Hong Kongers. While findings of the surveys for the period from
2010 to 2016 show a strong degree of identification of Hong Kong people
with press freedom, freedom of speech, equal opportunity, and privacy, iden-
tification with these values and with the cultural icons of Hong Kong show
no correlation to either strengthening or weakening support of the mainland
regime. This insight actually stands in contrast to the narrative of Hong
Kong localism that tends to put Hong Kong identity in strict opposition to
Chinese mainlanders in Hong Kong and the Chinese regime. On the whole,
the authors provide a sophisticated picture of a socially contingent Hong
Kong identity.
In the last contribution of this special issue, anthropologist Gordon Math-
ews documents an understudied facet of Hong Kong, i.e., the situation of
asylum seekers in Hong Kong, as well as the policies dealing with them and
how they are perceived by some Hong Kong youth. Drawing from the au-
thor’s 12 years of weekly interactions with asylum seekers, he documents
a defining feature of the situation of asylum seekers in Hong Kong, i.e., their
having virtually zero chance of being granted refugee status, and hence their
being stuck in Hong Kong in a liminal and rather precarious status for many
years. We see here the institutional and bureaucratic production of “illegal-
ity” in that while these asylum seekers are not allowed to work, they are
compelled to do so in order to survive in Hong Kong. Mathews suggests
that there may be a tacit acceptance of this situation by the Hong Kong
authorities so as to “enable a flexible irregular labour force.” If the institu-
tional and legal process through which this takes place is specific to Hong
Kong, this institutional production of illegality and of various forms of sta-
tuses of labourers somehow serves the working of the political economies
of global capitalism and is a common pattern found in other major global
cities around the world. Moreover, contrary to the increasing economic in-
tegration and consequent blurring of borders between Hong Kong and the
mainland pointed to at the outset of this editorial, this final contribution
somehow hints at the maintenance of an attribute of sovereignty for Hong
Kong, as the government took over from the United National High Com-
missioner for Refugees in evaluating the status of asylum seekers from 2014
onward. But the key argument Mathews makes in his article is that in a con-
text of increasing alienation of Hong Kong youth from their government
and from the Chinese regime, asylum seekers have become symbols of Hong
Kong’s non-Chineseness to those youth who are acquainted with them, and
the result, the author suggests, is a more welcoming Hong Kong. 
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